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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of ownership structure, board attributes and
eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) on annual financial reporting timeliness of non-financial
companies listed on Borsa Istanbul (BIST).
Design/methodology/approach –To conduct the analyses, the authors used two samples. Themain sample
consists of 187 companies, while the subsample includes 54 companies in the BIST 100 index. The data set
covers the 2010–2018 period. To investigate the influence of ownership structure, board attributes and XBRL
on timeliness, panel regression and univariate analyses were used. To explore the factors associated with the
likelihood of late filing, panel logistic regression analyses were employed.
Findings –The findings provide evidence that companies that have a high level of institutional ownership and
women board membership file earlier. In line with prior studies, profitable companies file their accounts faster.
Highly leveraged companies are late reporters. Further, XBRL has a positive influence on the filing of financial
reports for the BIST 100 companies due to technological agility. Finally, companies that have less institutional
ownership and that get qualified audit opinions are more subject to late filing.
Research limitations/implications – The authors acknowledge that this study has certain limitations.
First, the results may not be generalized to the entire BIST population due to the exclusion of financial
companies from the samples. Future research may explore the financial reporting timeliness of these
companies. Second, the study did not investigate the relationship between timeliness and the information
content in financial statements and themarket reactions they arouse. Third, this study is trying to find out early
evidence on the mandatory adoption of XBRL filings, which cover only three-year period due to the recent
implementation of this regulatory practice. Thus, it needs further elaboration after the accumulation of data in
the forthcoming years by the expansion of the sample beyond the 2016–2018 period. As companies would have
more time to become familiar with XBRL, a more reliable conclusion may be drawn. Further, the study
particularly focuses on the effect of XBRL adoption on the timeliness among filers. XBRL could also influence
investors, auditors and other stakeholders. Future research could investigate the influence of XBRL on
different stakeholders to produce more insightful implications.
Practical implications –This study offers several implications for managers, regulators and policy makers.
First, companies that do not make timely financial reporting may find it more difficult to attract long-term
capital bymeans of institutional investors. Since these investors view timely reporting as an ideal ingredient in
corporate governance, it may have a positive impact on company reputation and corporate sustainability. The
results also provide insights for regulatory authorities, policy makers and auditors on the causes of the
reporting lag, thereby increasing their awareness and helping them in their decision-making process since
improvements in timely availability and accessibility of financial information reduce information asymmetry
for users and increasemarket efficiency. Additionally, companies that reduce their filing timeframewill be able
to compare their results with other companies. However, the XBRLmandate could be much more burdensome
to smaller firms. Thismay stem from the fact that larger firmsmay tend to use the in-house approach for XBRL
and can afford more advanced financial reporting systems with automated coding algorithms attached to
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difference in the level of resources available for XBRL preparation. This finding also lends support to recent
concerns that new technology creates an unleveled benefit in reporting efficiency for large companies, but not
for small ones (e.g. Blankespoor et al., 2014). This benefit may change the dynamics of the financial market and
information environment, leading to further segmentation of the capital markets. The positive effects of XBRL
adoption may accrue over time due to the potential benefits of learning curve experience since the XBRL
mandate will help companies automate their reporting process and information processing, thereby
strengthening internal control over financial reporting (Deloitte, 2013; Du et al., 2013; Li, 2017). Companies may
also efficiently incorporate auditor-proposed adjustments by cross-referencing impacted accounts and prepare
revised versions of the financial reports, which are automatically rendered in various formats for auditors to
assess (Wu and Vasarhelyi, 2004). Finally, investors and other users of financial information benefit from
having quicker access to data, since this allows them to make more timely and reliable decisions, leading to
greater benefits.
Originality/value –This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of adoptingXBRL on the timeliness
of financial reporting in emerging markets. Second, this study extends the literature and provides evidence on
determinants of timeliness, covering both ownership structure and board attributes besides firm-specific
characteristics. Hence, it provides valuable insights for companies, investors, auditing firms and policymakers.
Keywords Board attributes, Borsa Istanbul, Financial reporting, Ownership structure, Timeliness, XBRL
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Timely disclosure is an important attribute of financial reporting for the capital markets to
function well. The International Accounting Standards Board identifies timeliness to be an
essential aspect of reporting in reaching relevant financial information, while the OECD
(2004) lists timeliness as a good corporate governance principle. Regulatory authorities
particularly focus on timely disclosure of financial information and set out mandatory rules
for filing to reduce dissemination of asymmetric information (Jaggi andTsui, 1999). Although
the permitted financial reporting lag differs among countries, most of the companies do not
wait until the end of the statutory period to file their annual reports.
Since financial information helps build investor confidence, allows assessment of
corporate performance and enhances market efficiency, companies often adopt policies to
comply with the regulations and file their financial statements on time to enable shareholders
and stakeholders to take rational decisions (Abdelsalam and Street, 2007). Ashton et al. (1987)
noted that delaying information usually makes the market less efficient due to investors
postponing their investment decisions, which, in turn, affects corporate performance.
Further, as argued by Owusu-Ansah (2000), timeliness is a useful tool in dealing with
inefficiencies in capital markets. Thus, the more promptly the information is disclosed, the
more relevant it is for users of financial reports.
Conversely, financial information becomes less relevant with the passage of time, and late
filing may lead to a loss of reputation for companies due to a lack of transparency (Impink
et al., 2012). Thus, the value of timely financial reporting and the cost of early reporting must
be balanced. In this frame, many companies publish their financial information using
eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) format which is a global electronic
reporting standard (Taylor and Dzuranin, 2010). XBRL enables firms to automatically
process information by computer software, cutting out laborious and costly processes of
manual reentry and comparison (Alles, 2009). According to SEC (2009), the major benefits of
submitting financial information using XBRL include a greater level of financial information
available to investors in a timelier and less costly manner, financial information with fewer
errors and the ability to more easily compare financial information. Thus, XBRL is expected
to increase the efficiency and timeliness of financial reporting by reducing the time and effort
it takes the companies to generate reports for users (Dye, 2010; Yoon and Lee, 2011). It also
benefits users by reducing the effort associated with converting company reports from
various formats to a format that serves their unique needs (Taylor and Dzuranin, 2010).
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The timeliness of financial reporting has also been related to ownership structure and
board attributes. Many studies have documented that as ownership gets more concentrated,
the controlling shareholders can potentially take advantage of good will from minority
shareholders, delaying financial information disclosure (Abdelsalam and Street, 2007;
Bebchuck and Hamdani, 2009; Bushman et al., 2004; Marston and Polei, 2004). In contrast,
studies held on board characteristics have usually identified a positive relationship between
timeliness and board independence and board size, confirming greatermonitoring role of non-
executive directors (Abdelsalam and Masry, 2008; Ezat and El-Masry, 2008). Thus, these
findings show that the evidence on the determinants of the timeliness is not clear-cut,
particularly in emerging markets. This provides the motivation for this study.
This study aims to investigate the determinants of timeliness in financial reporting for the
companies, listed on Borsa Istanbul (BIST) over the period 2010–2018. The sample covers 187
non-financial companies. In this study, the timeliness (TM) or the reporting lead time is
defined as the number of days between the financial year-end and a company’s release date of
the annual report. We measure timeliness on three determinants, including ownership
structure, board attributes and XBRL adoption. We also examine the impact of firm-specific
attributes as control variables on timeliness of annual reports.
This paper has several contributions. First, it contributes to the literature on the impact of
XBRL adoption on timeliness of financial reporting in emerging markets. Although XBRL
mandate may affect information processing efficiency to improve the timeliness of financial
reporting, no study has ever assessed the impact of the XBRL mandate on the timeliness of
financial reports filing in Turkey, a leading country in emerging capital markets [1]. Second,
this study extends the literature and provides evidence on determinants of timeliness,
covering both ownership structure and board attributes besides firm-specific attributes.
Hence, it provides valuable insights for companies, investors, auditing firms and policy
makers in improving financial reporting and in increasing market efficiency.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a regulatory and
conceptual background and sets out the hypotheses; Section 3 describes the data and
methodology; Section 4 presents the empirical findings; and, finally, Section 5 concludes with
a discussion of the findings.
2. Regulatory background, literature review and hypotheses
2.1 Regulatory background
Financial information should be timely available to provide valuable insights for decision
makers. Regulatory authorities require listed companies to publish their audited financial
statements within a specified period after the accounting year-end period. In Turkey, the
obligations of the listed companies in reporting their annual financial statements are defined
by two regulatory sources: (1) Turkish Commercial Law (TCL) and (2) Capital Markets Law.
The new TCL, issued in July 2012, requires that financial statements of all companies,
whether they are listed or not, be prepared in conformity with the Turkish Financial
Reporting Standards, which are the Turkish adaptations of the International Financial
Reporting Standards. According to the TCL, companies should prepare their annual financial
statements at least three weeks before the annual general assembly and no later than the end
of the third month.
According to the Turkish regulations, listed companies must prepare their interim
financial statements every quarter in accordance with the Turkish Accounting Standards
and the Capital Market Board (CMB). Yearly and semi-annual financial statements must be
approved by the independent auditing firms. In accordance with the CMB legislation, listed
companies must file their financial statements electronically to the public via the Public




In Turkey, from 1989 to 2003, the CMB communique, enacted in 1989 and titled as “Rules
and Principles Related to Financial Statements in the Capital Market,”was the only regulatory
source that obliged listed companies to publish financial statements in a statutory timeframe.
Although the CMB published several communiques related to the financial reporting from
1989 to 2003, there were no major changes in the timing of financial statements filings. The
communique enacted in 2003 [2] obliged companies to publish their unconsolidated financial
statements within 10 weeks of the financial year-end, and consolidated financial statements
within 14 weeks of the financial year-end. These requirements became effective for listed
companies by the beginning of 2005. To harmonize accounting standards, the CMB issued a
new communique [3] in 2008 by updating its 2003 predecessor (CMB, 2008).
A new communique [4] was issued by the CMB in 2013 and shortened the deadline for the
filing of accounts for listed companies by 10 days. This regulation became effective at the
beginning of 2014, requiring listed companies to disclose their annual consolidated financial
statements within 70 days, unconsolidated financial statements within 60 days, first and
third quarter consolidated financial statements within 40 days, first and third quarter
unconsolidated financial statements within 30 days, second quarter consolidated financial
statements within 50 days and second quarter unconsolidated financial statements within
40 days from the year-end date. Further, the CMB has mandated the use of the PDP for the
dissemination of financial statements since June 2009. The aim is to facilitate the processing
of financial information and any other material events for investors and other stakeholders.
One final note on regulatory framework is that authorities often adopt rules requiring
companies to provide financial information in an interactive and machine-readable format
since it enables investors to capture and analyze informationmore quickly and at a lower cost
(CFA Institute, 2017). One of these formats is XBRL. XBRL taxonomies are the core element in
digital financial reporting and represent a useful support for companies to increase their
transparency and preserve interoperability of financial reports (Valentinetti and Rea, 2011,
2012). In June 2016, the CSD [5] mandated the use of the XBRL for filing financial reports
across listed companies to increase the speed and availability of financial information and to
improve processes and efficiency. The companies prepared their first annual filings by using
XBRL format in 2016. Different from many countries, there has been no voluntary period for
the companies to implement XBRL. They are required to use XBRL taxonomy to report only
their financial statements, but not their footnotes. Further, they are not allowed to extend the
tagging.
2.2 Literature review
Many researchers have investigated different aspects of timeliness in financial reporting
since it is an essential ingredient of corporate reporting theory. While there are numerous
studies addressing different determinants of timeliness, the dimensions of ownership
structure, board attributes and the impact of XBRL adoption remain slightly in the shadows,
especially in emerging markets.
One line of studies on timeliness has focused on the impact of board attributes and
ownership structure on financial reporting (Abdelsalam and Masry, 2008; Alsmady, 2018;
Lim, 2012). Abdelsalam and Masry (2008) examined the influence of board members’
independence and ownership structure on timeliness of corporate Internet reporting by a
sample of Irish-listed companies, revealing that timeliness is positively associated with the
independence of board members, supporting the stewardship theory that focuses on
achieving the goals of companies in protection of long-term welfare of other parties. Lim
(2012) provided evidence on how ownership concentration and structure relate to the
timeliness in Malaysia by using a sample of 1,276 firms from 1996 to 2009, showing that
closely held firms report earlier, particularly if the largest shareholder is a foreigner or a
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financial institution. Alsmady (2018) investigated the effects of board attributes and
ownership types on timeliness of financial reports for 68 companies listed on the Amman
Stock Exchange over the period 2011–2015, and showed that CEO duality and women
presence have significant effects on financial reporting. He also indicated that the age and size
of the company have a negative effect on timeliness, while foreign ownership has a positive
effect.
Regulatory change may be another determinant of timeliness, and it is in line with the
compliance theory proposed by Tyler (1990). The mandate of XBRL is one of them. XBRL
adoptionmay ease regulatory compliance to the extent that it promotesmore timely reporting
and allows easier comparison of information across companies (Baldwin and Trinkle, 2011;
Valentinetti and Rea, 2013). Compliance with the mandate may also prompt companies to
update their information systems to implement XBRL reporting. More powerful information
systems can accomplish financial reporting more quickly (Du and Wu, 2018). Requiring
information providers to use common elements with defined meanings facilitates automated
consumption of reports, thereby enhancing transparency and legitimacy, which is in linewith
the institutional theory (Debreceny et al., 2011). Bunching theory claims that financial
information acquisition and disclosure are bunched together with minimal or no time lag in
between and suggests a minimal lag between financial information processing and its
disclosure with the XBRLmandate; thus, financial reporting can be filed in a timelier fashion
(Dye, 2010).
In fact, XBRL filing does not replace traditional annual filing; rather, it serves as an
additional set of files to be filed with the CMB. By using XBRL, companies can automate data
collection and dissemination processes. XBRL also enables preparers to use software to tag
data in financial reports to the elements within a taxonomy and focuses on the delivery of a
more efficient, better-controlled and detailed financial reporting process to increase the
functionality (Dunne et al., 2013). Thus, the interactive data in the format of XBRL free up
resources from manual reporting tasks, and eventually help filers improve the timeliness of
and speed at which they generate financial information while reducing the cost of filing,
adding value to businesses, providing improvements in information flows, increasing the
efficiency of financial reporting, enhancing inter-company comparability and cross-sectional
analysis in many different forms to accommodate varying user needs (SEC, 2009;
Willis, 2005).
Existing literature shows evidence that the XBRL mandate improves the timeliness of
financial reporting (Du andWu, 2018; Weissmueller and Johnson, 2014; Yoon and Lee, 2011).
Yoon and Lee (2011) examined the effect of XBRL filing requirements on timeliness of
financial reporting by using 1,908 companies in the USA, revealing that the release horizons
have been slightly shortened after XBRL mandate, particularly for large companies, but the
difference was not statistically significant. Similarly, using a sample of 50 firms from the 2009
Fortune 500 listing, Weissmueller and Johnson (2014) find that the firms file their 10-Qs and
10-Ks reports earlier after the XBRL mandate. Du and Wu (2018) investigated the effect of
XBRL on timeliness by using annual and quarterly filings in the USA from 2007 to 2014,
indicating that the reporting lag is shortened by one to two days after the XBRL adoption.
They further provided the evidence that the XBRL mandate improves the timeliness of
financial reporting for large filers. Zhou (2019) examined how XBRL adoption is associated
with 10-K filing timeliness in the USA from 2007 to 2016, arguing that the XBRL mandate
decreases the 10-K filing lag for Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 accelerated filers, while filing lag
increases significantly in the post-XBRL period for Tier 3 smaller reporting companies.
Another stream of studies has addressed the association of XBRL adoption, timeliness
and internal control performance (Amin et al., 2018; Hwang et al., 2020). Since the companies
generally create XBRL-tagged financial statements by converting their traditional financial




efficiency of their XBRL tagging process. Amin et al. (2018) argued that the mandated XBRL
disclosure incentivizes firms to automate the financial reporting process, which enhances
internal control efficiency and results in higher audit confidence and reduced audit hours.
Hwang et al. (2020) investigated 1,344 firms over the period of 2006–2013 to explore the
impact of internal control weaknesses (ICWs) on the timeliness of financial reporting after the
XBRL mandate and indicated that the filing lags of companies with ICWs are longer than
those of companies without ICWs under the mandated XBRL disclosure. Their analyses also
revealed that the XBRL mandate has affected firms’ filing behaviors differently, depending
on firm characteristics such as firm size.
Some other studies on timeliness have offered evidence on firm-specific factors. Abdulla
(1996) investigated the association between timeliness of annual reports and a set of
determinants for 26 Bahraini companies, identifying a negative relationship between
timeliness and profitability, and firm size. This result supports the signaling theory which
suggests that more profitable companies abide by the deadline through reporting earlier.
Owusu-Ansah (2000) examined annual reporting by 47 companies listed on the Zimbabwe
Stock Exchange and reported company size and profitability as significant explanators for
timeliness. Ajmi (2008) analysed the timeliness of annual reports for 231 companies listed on
the Bahrain Stock Exchange over the period of 1992–2006, showing that size, profitability
and leverage are the main determinants. T€urel (2010) examined the impact of firm-specific
and audit-related factors on the timeliness of financial reporting by 211 non-financial
companies listed on BIST for 2007, indicating that companies that report net income and have
unqualified audit opinions file earlier, while the companies audited by Big Four [6] are late
reporters. Erer and C€omert (2014) explored the relationship between firm attributes and
timeliness of financial reporting for non-financial companies listed on BIST from 2003 to
2010, indicating that high-leveraged companies are late reporters. They also stated that
companies audited by Big Four and whose audit reports were unqualified and that did not
change their auditors were early reporters.
2.3 Hypotheses development
2.3.1 Ownership structure. Ownership structure and the identity of shareholders are
important attributes in explaining the timeliness of financial reporting. Companies that have
more sophisticated investors usually provide more timely financial information. This is
simply because long-term dedicated institutional investors are more likely to demand timely
dissemination of financial information than transient institutional investors, in tandem with
their better shareholder activism engagement (Bamahros and Wan-Hussin, 2006). This is in
line with the disclosure theory, and it enhances financial reporting timeliness. In this study,
we identify two types of ownership based on their influence on the market performance of
companies: foreign ownership and institutional ownership.
2.3.1.1 Foreign ownership. Foreign investors are geographically dispersed, and they
demand more information to monitor managerial activities. They are long-term investors,
and they do not change their portfolios very often. Thus, timely financial information leads to
better price discovery for them. Further, they have sophisticated skills to analyze financial
information provided by companies (Kim andYi, 2009). These comparative advantages allow
foreign investors to exercise pressure on companies to disclose financial information in a
timely manner. This is also supported by the fact that companies with foreign investors are
associated with higher transparency and lower information asymmetries (Jiang and Kim,
2004). Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
H1a. The reporting lead time is negatively associated with foreign ownership.
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2.3.1.2 Institutional ownership. Institutional investors have to comply with strict rules due to
their responsibilities to the investors (Lim, 2012). They have resources, expertise and
sophisticated tools to analyze financial information. They may also force management to act
in the best interest of shareholders (Conover et al., 2008). Institutional investors may either
directly monitor companies or act as active traders. This implies that high level of
institutional ownership positively affects the timeliness of financial reporting and decreases
reporting lag since they push companies to publish their financial information fast (Sengupta,
2004). Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H1b. The reporting lead time is negatively associated with institutional ownership.
2.3.2 Board attributes. Recent changes in corporate governance, especially on the issue of
board composition, havemotivated attempts to explore the link between timeliness and board
diversity. Board characteristics may have significant influences on the timeliness by
accelerating or decelerating the timely disclosure of financial information. In this study, we
explore the effects of board characteristics on timeliness by using three attributes: board size,
independent board membership and gender diversity.
2.3.2.1 Board size. Although board of directors plays a vital role for corporate governance,
research findings are mixed. Some authors argue that larger boards are helpful to companies
since sharing knowledge, experience and ideas could lead to more efficient decision-making
(Zainal Abidin et al., 2009). Further, larger boards are more effective in monitoring companies
than smaller boards (Fauzi and Locke, 2012). However, other studies claim that larger boards
may cause delays in financial reporting due to the risk of a decrease in coordination among
board members (Eisenberg et al., 1998). They claimed that a small board may be more
effective and capable of presenting better financial reports that will improve the timeliness of
financial reports. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H2a. The reporting lead time is positively associated with board size.
2.3.2.2 Independent board membership. Board members perform necessary duties to protect
the interests of investors; facilitating timely disclosures is one such duty. Independent board
members have a positive influence on the timeliness and play an effective role in solving
agency problems. They have few benefits from late reporting and insist on greater quality, as
reflected in more timely disclosure of financial information (Abdelsalam and Street, 2007).
Therefore, outside directors encourage timely disclosure to support shareholder interest and
to avoid bearing reputation cost (Borokhovich et al., 1996;Weisbach, 1988). Thus, we propose
the following hypothesis:
H2b. The reporting lead time is negatively associated with the independent board
membership.
2.3.2.3 Gender diversity. Female participation on board is one of the leading business
approaches in many countries. As argued by Ren and Wang (2011), there is pressure in
society to increase gender representativeness on boards. The presence of women directors
has strong implications in decision-making. Srinidhi et al. (2011) and Gul et al. (2011) claimed
that gender diversity could improve the quality of discussions and increase a board’s ability
in disclosure and reporting. Gavious et al. (2012) indicated that there is a significant
relationship between accounting aggressiveness and women board membership. From these
discussions, it is clear that women presence on board can decrease the amount of time needed
to sufficiently discuss, comprehend and evaluate financial information and therefore may
improve financial reporting timeliness. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:





2.3.3 XBRL adoption. Technology advancements in the last decades make online reporting
increasingly feasible (Basoglu and Hess, 2014). XBRL technology as a global reporting
standard enables investors and other stakeholders to access and use financial information in
an easier and faster way. There are several reasons why the adoption of XBRL should be
associated with shorter reporting lags. First, as SEC (2009) indicates, XBRL assists in
automating financial reports and information processing. The process of applying the XBRL
taxonomy to prepare financial reports leads companies to producing meaningful and
transparent documents, thus improving information sharing with external parties (Pinsker
and Li, 2008). Second, the XBRL requirement can help in consolidating results very quickly
and reliably between units and subunits. This allows companies to achieve internal benefits
and automatically generate financial reports (Vasarhelyi et al., 2010; Via and Garbellotto,
2015). Finally, using interactive data tagging automates financial reporting process. By
avoiding the need to manually extract data from multiple documents, companies reduce the
human effort required for proofreading, reviewing, checking and adding footnotes (Pinsker
and Li, 2008). Automating the financial reporting process reduces the risk of human error and
opportunities for management fraud and manipulation of accounting numbers, increasing
preparer efficiency (Kim et al., 2013; Wu and Vasarhelyi, 2004).
Prior studies claim that the XBRL mandate increases the efficiency and timeliness of
financial reporting due to an automated process (Amin et al., 2018; Du and Wu, 2018;
Weissmueller and Johnson, 2014; Yoon and Lee, 2011). Amin et al. (2018) argued that the
implementation of XBRL enables firms not only to share informationwith auditors efficiently
but also to automate the extraction of relevant accounting data for internal reporting, which
creates synergies between internal and external reporting and leads to shorter reporting lag.
These benefits stem from more timely and transparent financial reporting (Hwang
et al., 2020).
Regulatory authorities also indicate that XBRL helps automate financial reporting and
information processing (SEC, 2009). Thus, XBRL requirement improves efficiency via an
automatic generation of financial reports, and it takes less time for a company to file its
financial statements (Via and Garbellotto, 2015). Thus, it significantly improves the ability of
accountants to more precisely direct and publish financial information to investors,
regulators, analysts, lenders and other key stakeholders. However, one should also note that
XBRL requires additional efforts and may increase the time to complete the filing of financial
statements. Firms can be exposed to insignificant costs, such as learning XBRL
classifications and how to create their own XBRL files. Nevertheless, as Du et al. (2013)
pointed out, the number of errors in XBRL filings significantly decreases as companies file
XBRL-formatted financial statements more. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
H3. There is a negative association between the reporting lead time and XBRL adoption.
2.3.4 Control variables. A review of previous studies addressing the timeliness of financial
information leads us to consider the following firm-specific attributes as control variables to
analyze the filing lag. These include financial performance, leverage, company size, audit
opinion and audit size.
2.3.4.1 Financial performance. The profitability of a company has significant effects on
timely reporting. Signaling theory suggests that the most profitable companies report earlier
(Ismail and Chandler, 2004). Prior studies indicate that companies are more likely to disclose
good news and delay the disclosure of bad news in line with the disclosure theories (Li, 2017;
Milgrom, 1981; Owusu-Ansah, 2000). Bowen et al. (1992) proposed two explanations for this
approach. The first one suggests that companies attempt to mitigate unfavorable reactions
from shareholders to bad news, while aggravate favorable reactions to good news. The
second explanation suggests that managers delay the disclosure of bad news, expecting that
some good news may take place in the meantime and can partially compensate the adverse
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effects of bad news (Givoly and Palmon, 1982; Lurie and Pastena, 1975). This approach is
consistent with the shareholder theory. The financial performance is measured by different
variables such as return on assets, return on equity and Tobin’s Q. In this study, we use
Tobin’s Q to measure the profitability.
2.3.4.2 Leverage. Leverage refers to the use of debt to finance the operations. There are
mixed results on the relationship between leverage and timeliness. Agency theory claims that
agency costs increase with the leverage since shareholders will be more likely to engage in
riskier activities that promise high returnswith that financial structure (Jensen andMeckling,
1976). Thus, highly leveraged companies are expected to be associated with timelier
disclosure to meet the needs of debt holders (Abdulla, 1996). However, the evidence in some
studies argue that highly leveraged companies may delay the filing of financial reports
because high leverage may increase financial distress and the probability of default, which
may be viewed as bad news (Carslaw and Kaplan, 1991; Owusu-Ansah, 2000).
2.3.4.3 Firm size. Firm size is a commonly used explanatory variable for financial
reporting timeliness. The argument is that larger companies are more likely to make timely
disclosure than smaller ones (Kutcher et al., 2007). Ashton et al. (1989) indicated that larger
companies are more likely to reduce reporting delay since they are more closely followed by
stakeholders. They are also able to afford higher audit fees and thus release their financial
reports earlier (Abdulla, 1996).
2.3.4.4 Audit company. Auditor type is also a determinant on timeliness. Auditing
companies may be split into two categories: the Big Four and others. Since Big Four
companies have more resources, strong technology and more experienced and qualified
human resources, they have flexibility in scheduling the audit and completing audit
processes, thereby enabling financial reporting in a relatively faster time (Afify, 2009; Al-
Ajmi, 2008; Clatworthy and Peel, 2016; Owusu-Ansah and Leventis, 2006; Schwartz and Soo,
1996; T€urel, 2010).
2.3.4.5 Audit opinion. Timeliness in financial reporting may be a function of the audit
opinion (Ashton et al., 1989; Carslaw and Kaplan, 1991). Companies that get an unqualified
opinion feel more comfortable since it gives a positive sign to the public about corporate
financial performance. These companies file their annual reports earlier (Afify, 2009; Al-Ajmi,
2008; Carslaw and Kaplan, 1991; Daoud et al., 2015; Ismail and Chandler, 2004; Nelson and
Shukeri, 2011; T€urel, 2010). The opposite is true when the companies get a qualified opinion.
3. Research methodology
3.1 Sample
This section outlines the sample selection process. We use two samples for conducting the
analyses. The main sample consists of 187 non-financial companies listed on Borsa Istanbul
(BIST ALL), while the subsample includes 54 non-financial companies in the BIST 100 index
(BIST 100). We exclude financial institutions from the analysis since they are subject to
special regulations. We used consolidated financial statements in our analysis. The timeline
for our data set covers the 2010–2018 period. Thus, we have 1,683 and 486 observations for
the main and subsample, respectively. We obtained the data from the following sources: (1)
Public Disclosure Platform, (2) Central Securities Depository of Turkey, (3) annual reports, (4)
company webpages and (5) direct connections by e-mail or contact with companies’ investor
relations departments. We collected board data manually to examine the effects of board
attributes on timeliness for the 54 companies in the BIST 100 index.
Our model also compares reporting lead time between pre-XBRL and post-XBRL periods.
As the companies became obliged to file their financial statements by XBRL since the year-
end of 2016, we have three years of post-XBRL observations for all filers. We employ two




end date and the company release date of financial reports (TM), and (2) a binarymeasure that
determines whether a company has disclosed its financial statements after the regulatory
deadline (LATE).
Financial year-end Regulatory deadlineCompany release date
Timeliness Late Filing 
(LATE)
3.2 Variables definition and measurement
We use a number of dependent, independent and control variables to conduct the analyses.
We list and define our variables in Table A1 in the Appendix.
We use two measures of financial reporting timeliness as dependent variables in our
models: timeliness and late filing. Similar to other studies (Owusu-Ansah, 2000; Owusu-
Ansah and Leventis, 2006), we measure timeliness or the reporting lead time (TM) as the
number of days between the financial year-end and a company’s release date of the annual
report.
Late filing (LATE) is computed by a binary variable, where “1” indicates if the company
files its financial statements after the regulatory deadline, and “0” otherwise.
To estimate the determinants of timeliness, we use three sets of independent variables,
namely, ownership structure, board attributes and XBRL adoption. While ownership
structure involves foreign ownership and institutional ownership, board attributes consist of
board size, independent board membership and women board membership.
Figure 1 outlines the research framework along with the hypothesized relationships.







● Independent board membership
















3.3.1 Timeliness regression analysis. This section presents the models for data analyses. To
explore the influence of ownership structure, board attributes and XBRL mandate on
timeliness, we used the following cross-sectional regression models. In the following
equations, subscript i denotes the ith firm and subscript t denotes the tth period.
TMi;t ¼ α1 þ X1FOWNi;t þ X2IOWNi;t þ X3Tobin0s Qi;t þ X4LEVi;t þ X5SIZEi;t
þ X6BIG4i;t þ X7OPINi;t þ Year Fixed Effectsþ εi;t
(1)
TMi;t ¼ α1 þ X1XBRLi;t þ X2XBRLi;t*SIZEi;t þ X3XBRLi;t*BIG4i;t þ X4Tobin0s Qi;t
þ X5LEVi;t þ X6SIZEi;t þ X7BIG4i;t þ X8OPINi;t þ εi;t
(2)
TMi;t ¼ α1 þ X1BSIZEi;t þ X2BINDi;t þ X3BWMNi;t þ X4Tobin0s Qi;t þ X5LEVi;t
þ X6SIZEi;t þ X7BIG4i;t þ X8OPINi;t þ Year Fixed Effectsþ εi;t
(3)
For Model 1, the sample size is 1,683 observations (187 companies) and the period is 2010–
2018. To rule out the possibility that reporting lag has declined over the period for reason
unrelated to XBRL adoption (i.e. CMB’s most recent changes to the filing deadline in 2013),
our sample for Model 2 starts from 2014. The resulting sample size is 935 observations, and
the sample period ranges from 2014 to 2018. For Model 3, the sample size is 486 observations
(54 companies in the BIST 100 index), and the sample period is 2010–2018.
In Model 2, XBRL is a variable that takes “1” if a firm year belongs to post-XBRL period
(2016, 2017 and 2018), and “0” otherwise (2014, 2015). The interaction term XBRL*SIZE
indicates how the timeliness of large firms has changed between pre- and post-XBRL periods
compared to small firms. The interaction term XBRL*BIG4 indicates how the timeliness of
firms audited by BIG4 has changed between pre- and post-XBRL periods.
We include year fixed effects to control for differences in reporting lag across time
(following Amin et al., 2018). One could argue that reporting lag may well have decreased
without the adoption ofXBRL. We control for this possibility via year fixed effects inModel 1
and Model 3.
To estimate the regression model, we first conducted a fixed effects model and an F test to
see if any firm-specific characteristics exist. We rejected the null hypothesis and concluded
that there were individual effects, and that the pooled OLS model cannot be used. In the next
step, we employed Hausman (1978) test. The test indicated that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis, and therefore we preferred random effects model over fixed effects model.
Additionally, we tested whether the assumptions of the regression model were violated.
We employed the approaches of Levene (1961) and Brown and Forsythe (1974) for
heteroscedasticity. These approaches are designed to check the equality of variances
between the cross-section units. Hence, we concluded that the estimated random effects
model has an autocorrelation problem. In the next step, we employed Baltagi–Wu locally best
invariant (LBI) and the Durbin Watson test to detect the existence of autocorrelation for
random effects model. We concluded that the estimated model has an autocorrelation
problem. To eliminate heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems, we reestimated the
model with the estimator of Arellano (1987), Froot (1989) and Rogers (1993).
3.3.2 Late filing regression analysis. We conducted logistic regression analyses to
investigate the factors associated with the likelihood of firms filing late (coded as unity in the
dependent variable). We defined a company as a late filer if it files the report beyond the
timeline dictated by the regulation. We would expect late filers to have generally poorer




LATEi;t ¼ α1 þ X1Tobin0s Qi;t þ X2LEVi;t þ X3SIZEi;t þ X4BIG4i;t þ X5OPINi;t
þ X6FOWNi;t þ X7IOWNi;t þ X8XBRLi;t þ εi;t
(4)
LATEi,t is computed by a binary variable, where “1” indicates if the company files its
accounts after the regulatory deadline, and “0” otherwise.
After estimating the logit and probit models, we first assessed the level of statistical
significance of each specification with several tests. The null hypothesis that every single
indicator is zero was tested with a Z-test on each parameter. Thereafter, the joint hypothesis
that all the coefficients are zero was tested via a chi-squared test. In the final step, the McFad
R square and LR statistic values were calculated to analyze the explanatory power of
the model.
4. Empirical findings
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations among the variables for
BISTALL companies. None of the correlations between predictor variables has a value above
0.49. The variance inflation factors (VIF) for the variables are also far lower than the cut-off
value of 10, suggesting thatmulticollinearity is not a concern for ourmodels [7]. By using data
from 1,683 observations over the period of 2010–2018, we found the average reporting time as
64 days. Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations among the
variables for the BIST 100 companies with board data. None of the correlations between
predictor variables has a value above 0.49. By using data from 486 observations over the
period of 2010–2018, we found the reporting lead time (TM) as 62 days.
Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics, the number of late filing companies and the
number of companies filing on last day for each year. As shown in Table 3, we observe that
the reporting lead time (TM) has decreased by 10–15 days after the implementation of new
regulatory deadlines on filing in 2013. Since 2013, on average, 38% of the companies have
reported their accounts either on the last day of regulatory deadlines or later.
We also analyze the trend in reporting lag in Table A2 in Appendix. We observe a 3-day
(3.90%), 13-day (17.57%) and 2-day (3.28%) decrease in the mean reporting lag for the years
2012, 2013 and 2014, respectively. In all other years, the reporting lag exhibits no change until
2018. In 2018, there is a 1-day (1.69%) decrease in themean reporting lag. Themain reason for
the high decrease in 2013 is the regulatory policy change in the reporting period, shortening
the deadline of filings by 10–15 days, and affecting the companies in the following years
(Table 3).
Before estimating the regression equation for Model 2, we first conducted a univariate
analysis to compare the reporting lag for pre- and post-XBRL adoption periods. We set the
sample period to four years around 2016, when XBRL was initiated; two years before (2014
and 2015) and two years after (2017 and 2018) XBRL mandate. We excluded the transition
year of 2016 from the sample to minimize a possible confounding effect. A paired-sample t-
test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test were conducted for both BIST ALL and BIST 100
companies. Table 4 presents the results. For BIST ALL companies, the mean of release
horizons for post-XBRL period is 58.62 days, which is shorter than that of pre-XBRL period
(59.30 days) by 0.68 days and the difference is statistically significant at the 10% level for
Wilcoxon signed-rank test and insignificant for t-test. For BIST 100 companies, the mean of
release horizons for post-XBRL period is 56.10 days, which is shorter than that of pre-XBRL
period (58.14 days) by 2.04 days and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level
for both tests. These results show that the effect of mandatory XBRL adoption on timeliness
is slightly more salient for large companies. This is in line with the findings of other studies













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5 displays the parameter estimates of the effects of ownership structure, XBRL
adoption and control variables on timeliness of financial reporting for the main sample, and
Table 6 shows the parameter estimates of the effects of board attributes on timeliness of
financial reporting for the subsample.
Table 5 displays the results of the random effects model. Model 1 shows that the
institutional ownership as independent variable and financial performance and leverage as
control variables are significant (p < 0.05). Of these variables, institutional ownership and
financial performance are negatively associated with TM, while leverage is positively
associated. These results are in line with the findings of other studies (Abdelsalam and Street,
2007; Abdulla, 1996; Ajmi, 2008; Carslaw andKaplan, 1991; Erer and C€omert, 2014; Lim, 2012;
Owusu-Ansah, 2000; T€urel, 2010). Model 2 shows that only leverage and size are significant
(p < 0.05) as control variables. Leverage is positively associated, while size is negatively
associated with TM. Thus, companies that show a better financial performance or have more
institutional investors file earlier. The results support hypotheses H1b. Institutional investors
prove to act as active investors in monitoring the financial reporting process, thus facilitating
speeding up the filing of accounts. We detect negative but insignificant relationship between
foreign ownership and TM (H1a). The coefficients for XBRL and for the interaction terms
XBRL*SIZE and XBRL*BIG4 are also insignificant for BIST ALL companies, showing that
XBRL adoption does not have any influence on timeliness.
Table 6 displays the parameter estimates of the effects of board attributes and control
variables on timeliness for our subsample. Model 3 shows that only women board
membership is significant (p < 0.05) and negatively associated with TM. The results support
H2c. We find no support for a significant association between board size (H2a), independent














filing on last day
Percentage of late
and last date filing
2010 73 28 99 16.92 2 46 25.67
2011 77 31 130 18.15 1 47 25.67
2012 74 37 104 17.55 3 58 32.62
2013 61 35 84 8.44 6 61 35.83
2014 59 30 71 9.30 2 70 38.50
2015 59 33 90 10.45 1 69 37.43
2016 59 32 119 11.60 2 67 36.90
2017 59 30 81 10.10 1 66 35.83



















58.14 (10.70) 56.10 (12.00) 2.04 2.39 (0.02)** 2.28 (0.023)**
Note(s): ** and * represent significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. The year
2016 is excluded from the sample to minimize a possible confounding effect
Table 3.
Descriptive statistics










studies (Du and Vu, 2018; Gavious et al., 2012; Gul et al., 2011; Sengupta, 2004; Via and
Garbellotto, 2015) and provide evidence that women presence on board improves the ability
of a board to file their annual reports faster by exhibiting better monitoring skills.
Table 7 displays the parameter estimates of the effects of ownership structure, XBRL
adoption and control variables on LATEmeasured by the probability of a company filing its
accounts after the regulatory deadline. The results of two estimating methodologies, namely
logit and probit models, are highly consistent for the pattern of parameter significance. The
results show that the institutional ownership and audit opinion are significant (p < 0.05) and
are negatively associated with TM. Apparently, companies with a stronger information
demand from institutional investors are less likely to be late in financial reporting.
The result on the audit opinion (OPIN) in Table 7 suggests that companies that receive
qualified opinions are late reporters. The auditors increase their audit time to eliminate any
disagreements. Another possible explanation could be that the managers may try to avoid a
qualified opinion by negotiating with the auditors not to harm their performance. This result
is in line with the findings of other studies (Afify, 2009; Al-Ajmi, 2008; Daoud et al., 2015;
Ismail and Chandler, 2004; Nelson and Shukeri, 2011; T€urel, 2010).
Table 8 presents a summary of the hypotheses, with the level of support for each.
Random effects Standard errors Arellano Froot Rogers
Variables
Variable





FOWN 3.52 (1.89)* 3.52 (3.28)
Institutional
ownership
IOWN 4.30 (1.80)** 4.30 (2.15)**
XBRL
adoption
XBRL 3.35 (4.40) 3.35 (4.64)
XBRL and
SIZE
XBRL*SIZE 0.14 (0.24) 0.14 (0.25)
XBRL and
BIG4




TOBIN’S Q 1.30 (0.37)*** 0.66 (0.40) 1.30 (0.51)*** 0.66 (0.48)
Leverage LEV 5.53 (1.07)*** 3.29 (1.35)** 5.53 (1.19)*** 3.29 (1.40)**
Size SIZE 0.12 (0.20) 1.32 (0.36)*** 0.12 (0.25) 1.32 (0.34)***
Audit
company
BIG4 0.51 (0.85) 0.93 (1.02) 0.51 (1.30) 0.93 (0.97)
Audit
opinion
OPIN 1.75 (1.06) 1.15 (1.06) 1.75 (1.37) 1.15 (0.97)
Constant 78.78 (3.76)*** 84.24 (6.78)*** 78.78 (4.47)*** 84.24 (6.32)***
R-squared
(overall)
0.32 0.12 0.32 0.12
Number of
Obs.
1,683 935 1,683 935






5. Discussion and conclusion
The timeliness and comparability of financial information are key elements that affect
information asymmetry between providers and users of the information in capital markets
and help enhance the value relevance and usefulness of that information for market
participants. This study investigates the determinants of timeliness in financial reporting of
non-financial companies listed on BIST over the period of 2010–2018. To conduct the
analysis, we use ownership structure and board attributes as the main variables. We also
examine whether the mandatory XBRL requirement of Capital Market Board of Turkey in
2016 affects the timeliness of financial reporting since we expect XBRL can help companies
Random effects
Variable names
Standard errors Arellano Froot Rogers
Variables Model 3 Model 3
Independent variables
Board attributes
Board size BSIZE 0.45 (0.37) 0.45 (0.50)
Independent board membership BIND 5.23 (6.17) 5.23 (8.18)
Women board membership BWMN 15.78 (5.21)*** 15.78 (7.66)***
Control variables
Financial performance TOBIN’S Q 0.09 (0.76) 0.09 (0.91)
Leverage LEV 3.62 (3.64) 3.62 (4.47)
Size SIZE 1.63 (0.75)** 1.63 (1.03)
Audit company BIG4 5.03 (1.81)*** 5.03 (4.01)
Audit opinion OPIN 5.59 (2.81)** 5.59 (4.98)
Constant 119.22 (15.18)*** 119.22 (19.05)***
R-squared (overall) 0.36 0.36
Number of Obs. 486 486
Note(s): Standard errors in parentheses **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.We do not report coefficients on the year fixed
effects
Variables Variable names




Foreign ownership FOWN 1.77 (0.89)** 0.73 (0.37)**
Institutional ownership IOWN 2.38 (0.82)*** 1.01 (0.36)***
XBRL adoption XBRL 0.09 (0.46) 0.02 (0.19)
Control variables
Financial performance TOBIN’S Q 0.79 (0.48) 0.30 (0.19)
Leverage LEV 0.78 (0.57) 0.30 (0.23)
Size SIZE 0.24 (0.15) 0.08 (0.06)
Audit company BIG4 0.30 (0.56) 0.19 (0.23)
Audit opinion OPIN 2.71 (0.50)*** 1.10 (0.21)***
Constant 6.30 (2.64)** 2.62 (1.09)**
LR statistic 42.67 41.97
McFadden R2 0.17 0.17
Number of Obs 1,683 1,683











prepare their reports more quickly under the internationally standardized taxonomies,
allowing information users to easily search for and facilitate the detection and collection of
information.
We use two samples. Themain sample consists of 187 companies listed on BIST, while the
subsample includes 54 companies in the BIST 100 index. The regression results for the main
sample (BIST ALL) show that institutional ownership, financial performance and size are
statistically significant and positively associated with the timely financial reporting, while
leverage is statistically significant and negatively associated with the timely reporting. Thus,
profitable or large companies and those companies that have high level of institutional
ownership are more likely to file their accounts earlier. Institutional investors’ preference for
lower information asymmetries accelerates timely disclosure of financial reports. According
to the regression results, XBRL mandate does not affect timeliness for companies in BIST.
However, the univariate test results indicate that the effect of mandatory XBRL adoption on
timeliness is slightlymore salient for the BIST 100 companies. The results are important since
timely provision of financial information at a reasonable cost is critical for investors and
managers.
For the subsample (BIST 100) that estimates the effects of board attributes and control
variables on timeliness, the findings reveal that only women board membership is
statistically significant and positively associated with the timely financial reporting. Thus,
companies that have more women on board release their financial statements earlier,











Hypothesis 1a: The reporting lead time is
negatively associated with foreign ownership
FOWN – – Not
supported
Hypothesis 1b: The reporting lead time is
negatively associated with institutional ownership
IOWN – – Supported*
Board attributes
Hypothesis 2a: The reporting lead time is
positively associated with board size
BSIZE þ – Not
supported
Hypothesis 2b: The reporting lead time is
negatively associated with the independent board
membership
BIND – þ Not
supported
Hypothesis 2c: The reporting lead time is
negatively associated with the presence of women
on board
BWMN – – Supported*
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative association
between the reporting lead time and XBRL
adoption
XBRL – – Not
supported
Control variables
Financial performance TOBIN’S Q – – Supported*
Leverage LEV þ þ Supported*
Size SIZE – – Supported*
Audit company BIG4 – – Not
supported
Audit opinion OPIN – – Not
supported





The results for the logit and probit analysis provide evidence that companies that have
less institutional ownership and get qualified audit opinions are more subject to late filing.
Further, the timeliness was negatively influenced by the reduction in the statutory filing
deadline set by the CMB policy change in 2013.
5.1 Managerial implications
This study offers several implications for managers, regulators and policy makers. First,
companies that do not make timely financial reporting may find it more difficult to attract
long-term capital by means of institutional investors. Since these investors view timely
reporting as an ideal ingredient in corporate governance, it may have a positive impact on
company reputation and corporate sustainability. The results also provide insights for
regulatory authorities, policy makers and auditors on the causes of the reporting lag, thereby
increasing their awareness and helping them in their decision-making process since
improvements in timely availability and accessibility of financial information reduce
information asymmetry for users and increase market efficiency.
Additionally, companies that reduce their filing timeframe will be able to compare their
results with other companies. However, the XBRLmandate could be muchmore burdensome
to smaller firms. This may stem from the fact that larger firms may tend to use the in-house
approach for XBRL and can afford more advanced financial reporting systems with
automated coding algorithms attached to streamline their XBRL filings, whereas smaller
firms are more likely to use the outsourcing approach due to the difference in the level of
resources available for XBRL preparation. This finding also lends support to recent concerns
that new technology creates an unleveled benefit in reporting efficiency for large companies,
but not for small ones (e.g. Blankespoor et al., 2014). This benefit may change the dynamics of
the financial market and information environment, leading to further segmentation of the
capital markets.
The positive effects of XBRL adoption may accrue over time due to the potential benefits
of learning curve experience since the XBRL mandate will help companies automate their
reporting process and information processing, thereby strengthening internal control over
financial reporting (Deloitte, 2013; Du et al., 2013; Li, 2017). Companies may also efficiently
incorporate auditor-proposed adjustments by cross-referencing impacted accounts and
prepare revised versions of the financial reports, which are automatically rendered in various
formats for auditors to assess (Wu andVasarhelyi, 2004). Finally, investors and other users of
financial information benefit from having quicker access to data since this allows them to
make more timely and reliable decisions, leading them to greater benefits.
5.2 Limitations and future research
We acknowledge that our study has certain limitations. First, the results may not be
generalized to the entire BIST population due to the exclusion of financial companies from the
samples. Future research may explore the financial reporting timeliness of these companies.
Second, the study did not investigate the relationship between timeliness and the information
content in financial statements and the market reactions they arouse. Third, this study is
trying to find out early evidence on the mandatory adoption of XBRL filings, which covers
only three-year period due to the recent implementation of this regulatory practice. Thus, it
needs further elaboration after the accumulation of data in the forthcoming years by the
expansion of the sample beyond the 2016–2018 period. As companies would have more time
to become familiar with XBRL a more reliable conclusion may be drawn. Further, we
particularly focus on the effect of XBRL adoption on the timeliness among filers. XBRL could
also influence investors, auditors and other stakeholders. Future research could investigate





1. Borsa Istanbul is categorized as an emergingmarket inmarket classification by several international
institutions, including World Federation of Exchanges, MSCI, FTSE.
2. Serial: XI, No: 25 Communique for Accounting Standards in Capital Markets.
3. Serial: XI, No: 29 Communique on Principles of Financial Reporting in Capital Markets.
4. II-14.1 Communique on Principles of Financial Reporting in Capital Markets.
5. https://www.mkk.com.tr/tr/genel-mektup/752 (accessed November 15, 2020).
6. The Big 4 refers to Pricewaterhouse Coopers, KPMG, Ernst &Young and Deloitte & Touche.
7. The rule of thumb is that there is evidence of collinearity problems if the variance inflation factor
(VIF) of a variable exceeds 10 (Gujarati, 1995, p. 339). The VIF scores can be given upon request.
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1 Timeliness or reporting
lead time (TM)
The number of days between the financial year-end and
a company’s release date of the annual report
Dependent
variable
2 Late filing (LATE) A binary variable, where “1” indicates if the firm files its






Foreign ownership is measured by the proportion of





Institutional ownership ismeasured by the proportion of
institutional investors shares to total shares
Independent
variable




Independent board membership is measured as the





Women board membership is measured as the
percentage of women directors on board
Independent
variable
8 XBRL adoption (XBRL) XBRL adoption is defined as a dummy variable, which
equals to “1” if there is amandatoryXBRL adoption, and
“0” otherwise (for years 2016, 2017, 2018 dummy





Financial performance is measured by using Tobin’s Q*
in line with previous studies (Guenster et al., 2006;
Ziegler and Schr€oder, 2010)
Control variable
10 Leverage (LEV) Leverage is computed by total liabilities divided by total
assets
Control variable
11 Size (SIZE) Size is computed as the natural logarithm of market
value of the firm
Control variable
12 Audit company (BIG4) Audit company is defined as a dummy variable. Audit
companies are classified as the Big Four and others. The
Big Four are assigned “1,” and the others are assigned
“0”
Control variable
13 Audit opinion (OPIN) Audit opinion is defined as a dummy variable. An
unqualified audit opinion is assigned “1”, and the rest is
assigned “0”
Control variable
Note(s): * Tobin’s Q is computed as follows
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Years Mean (TM) Change in TM from previous year Percent change in TM from previous year
2010 73
2011 77 4 5.48%
2012 74 3 3.90%
2013 61 13 17.57%
2014 59 2 3.28%
2015 59 0 0.00%
2016 59 0 0.00%
2017 59 0 0.00%
2018 58 1 1.69%
Note(s): Table reports the mean reporting lag over the sample period. Changes are computed in magnitude
and percentage
Table A2.
Reporting lag trend
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